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Elections
May I Put My Money Where My Mouth Is? How Chapter
241 Adds to the Tapestry of Campaign Finance Reform
Frank James Singer III
Code Sections Affected
Government Code §§ 84204, 84215, 85301, 85303, 85306,
85309, 85311, 85312, 85317, 85318, 85400, 85500, 85501,
85600, 85601, 89510 (amended), 85321 (new); 2000 STAT.
Ch. 102 § 83 (amended).
SB 34 (Burton & Johnson); 2001 STAT. Ch. 241.
What we have is two important values in direct conflict: freedom
of speech and our desire for healthy campaigns in a healthy
democracy. You can't have both.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Proponents of campaign finance reform decry that insufficient regulation
creates voter apathy and fosters the assumption that government is up for sale.
Still other proponents claim that "anything goes" in the current campaign finance
environment and that this laissez faire scenario results in a flawed political
process.3 Opponents of campaign finance reform reply that the First Amendment
protects the freedoms of speech and political association.4 They argue that
campaign finance reforms, limiting the amount of money that may be used for
political speech, affect the public's ability to exercise these rights.5 They question
1. See Nancy Gibbs, The Wake-Up Call: Clinton Makes Serious Noises About Campaign Reform, But
That May Not Be Enough to Change a Cozy System That Loves Special-interest Money, TIME, Feb. 3, 1997, at
22 (quoting U.S. Rep. Richard Gephardt).
2. See Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The System Cracks Under the Weight of Cash: Candidates,
Parties and Outside Interests Dropped a Record $2.7 Billion, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al (quoting Fred
Wertheimer, former President, Common Cause).
3. See id. (quoting Anthony Corrado, expert on campaign spending).
4. See Douglas Johnson & Mike Beard, Campaign Reform: Let's Not Give Politicians the Power to
Decide What We Can Say About Them, Cato Briefing Paper No. 31, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-
031.html, at 9 (July 4, 1997) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (calling the First Amendment the
Nation's cardinal election law).
5. See The Future of Campaign Finance Reform: Policy Forum Before the Cato Institute, at 5 (July 20,
2000) (reciting the arguments of U.S. Representative Tom DeLay that the First Amendment protection of
political speech must be defended). U.S. Representative DeLay contends that the liberty to debate demands the
ability to freely allocate resources for the broadcasting of differing views. Id.
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whether the First Amendment is really inconsistent with "healthy democracy"6
and contend that a politically active populace should not be punished.7 This
Article examines how Chapter 241 supplements California's campaign finance
regulation and compares its provisions with the U.S. Supreme Court paradigm
for campaign finance reform defined by Buckley v. Valeos and its progeny.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The U.S. Supreme Court laid the constitutional foundation for challenges to
campaign finance legislation in Buckley.9 First, the Court applied the strict
scrutiny standard of review to contribution limits, expenditure limits, and
disclosure requirements.'0 The Court upheld the federal contribution limits
because they imposed little direct restraint on contributors' political expression
and advanced the elimination of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption."
However, expenditure limits were not upheld because individuals who
independently spend money pose a minimal danger of actual or perceived
corruption, and expenditure limits directly and substantially burden First
Amendment rights to political expression. 2 Finally, the Court upheld disclosure
requirements because they are the least restrictive means of informing the public
6. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance "Reform" Proposals: A First Amendment Analysis, CATO
POLICY ANALYSIS No. 282, Sept. 4, 1997, at 17 (criticizing the quote of U.S. Representative, Richard Gephardt,
supra note 1, and questioning why a healthy democracy is inconsistent with freedom of speech).
7. See Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congress (Feb. 27, 1997) (quoting Bradley A. Smith, Assistant
Professor of Law, Capitol University Law School, as stating that "committing politics" should not be a crime).
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
9. See id. at 6-7 (considering the constitutionality of contribution limitations, expenditure limitations,
and disclosure requirements created in the Federal Election Campaign Act as amended in 1974); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394-397 (2000) (applying the paradigm for campaign finance law
outlined in Buckley to analogous State campaign finance law).
10. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (considering the appropriate standard of review for contribution limits
and expenditure limits, and rejecting the intermediate scrutiny standard applied by the circuit court because
spending money for political campaigns has a direct relationship to expression); id. at 25 (explaining that
contribution limits could only be upheld if the government were to show that the limits further an important
interest and avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms in meeting that interest); id. at 64-68
(insisting that there be a "relevant correlation" between the governmental interest and the disclosed
information). However, the Supreme Court validated the disclosure requirements at issue in Buckley because
disclosure furthered important governmental interests, and disclosure was the least restrictive means of meeting
those governmental interests. Id.
11. See id. at 26-27 (finding that mitigating corruption or the appearance of corruption resulting from
large contributions to candidates constitutes a compelling governmental interest); id. at 28-29 (concluding that
contribution limits are narrowly tailored to further the elimination of corruption or the appearance of corruption
because people were still allowed to speak about political matters, to volunteer services, and to associate with
candidates by making financial contributions).
12. See id. at 46 (rejecting the'argument that would-be contributors may circumvent contribution limits
by coordinating expenditures with candidates because coordinated expenditures are simply contributions); id. at
50 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966), and holding that legislative restrictions on political
advocacy are inconsistent with rights guaranteed by the First Amendment).
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of where political campaign money originates, deterring actual and apparent
corruption by exposing contributions, and gathering information necessary to
enforce contribution limits. 3
The Political Reform Act of 1974 4 is the bedrock of California campaign
finance regulation.'5 The dual purposes of the Act are to "inform the electorate
and to prevent the corruption of the political process." 6 The Act achieves these
goals by imposing campaign contribution limits, requiring disclosure of
expenditures," contributions,' and conflicts of interest; regulating the activities
of lobbyists; reformulating the state ballot; and eliminating laws and customs that
favor incumbents.' 9 The Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC or
Commission) administers the Act.20
In 1996, voters passed Proposition 208, which amended the Political Reform
Act of 1974 and imposed extremely low monetary contribution limits.2' The U.S.
District Court, Eastern District of California enjoined the FPPC from enforcing
the terms of Proposition 208 because the contribution limits were not sufficiently
narrowly drawn to prevent real or apparent corruption.2 ' After the District Court
13. Id. at 66-68. But see id. at 72-74 (allowing minority political parties to avoid disclosure requirements
if they can show that compliance with disclosure provisions will result in threats, harassments, or reprisals from
either the government or private individuals); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87,
101-02 (1982) (applying the Buckley caveat in excusing the Socialist Workers' Party from disclosing recipients
of campaign contributions and campaign expenditures).
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE, tit. 9, §§ 81000-91013 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002).
15. 28 CAL. JUR. 3D, Elections § 102 (2000).
16. See Socialist Workers 1974 Cal. Campaign Comm. v. Brown, 53 Cal. App. 3d 879, 889, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 915, 921 (2nd Dist. 1975) (holding that the twin aims of the Political Reform Act of 1974 promote
compelling state interests and justify reasonable restrictions on political expression and association).
17. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82025 (West Supp. 2002) (defining expenditure as "a payment, a
forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment, unless
it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political purposes.").
18. Id. § 82015 (West 1993) (defining contribution as "a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of
a loan by a third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment except to the extent that full and adequate
consideration is received unless it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political
purposes."). Furthermore, tickets to entertainment events, the candidate's own money or property, special
discounts or rebates not generally offered to the public for goods or services, and anything of value received by
a committee from another committee all constitute contributions. Id.
19. Id. § 81002(a)-(f) (West 1993).
20. See id. § 83100 (West 1993) (establishing the FPPC); id. § 83111 (West 1993) (granting the FPPC
primary responsibility for administration and implementation of the Political Reform Act of 1974); id. § 83112
(West 1993) (giving the FPPC power to "adopt, amend, and rescind rules and regulations" that further the
purposes of the Political Reform Act of 1974); id. § 83115 (West 1993) (permitting the FPPC to investigate
violations of the Political Reform Act of 1974); id. §§ 83116, 83118-83119 (West 1993) (authorizing the FPPC
to hold hearings that determine violations of the Political Reform Act of 1974, to impose penalties for
violations, to issue subpoenas, and to grant immunity to witnesses).
21. See generally Harllee Branch, Analysis of Proposition 34: Limits on Campaign Contributions and
Expenditures, CAL. INITIATIVE REV. 1, 4 (2000) (outlining some of the provisions of Proposition 208). In
districts with less than 100,000 residents, no more than $100 could be contributed by one person to a candidate
per election, $250 for larger districts, and $500 for statewide offices. Id.
22. California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1292-99, 1302
(E.D. Cal. 1998), affd. 164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999).
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issued the preliminary injunction against enforcement of Proposition 208, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the one thousand dollar contribution limit at issue
in Buckley is not a strict constraint on state campaign finance legislation." States
may impose more restrictive campaign contribution limits than those imposed by
federal statute if the state's interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption is sufficient to justify the burden placed on First Amendment rights
of speech and political association."
Voters ratified Proposition 34 in the November 2000 election. Proposition
34 repealed and amended many provisions of Proposition 208 affecting
contribution limits and disclosure requirements.26 Also, Proposition 34 furthered
a system of voluntary expenditure limits whereby candidates who agree to limit
the amount of money they spend seeking office can purchase space on the sample
27ballot for a message to voters.
III. CHAPTER 241
Chapter 241 makes several clerical2 and some substantive changes to
Proposition 34.29 The substantive changes affect disclosure requirements,
contribution restrictions, and voluntary expenditure limits. 30
Chapter 241 imposes a new obligation to report certain contributions made
outside the election cycle within ten days.3' Furthermore, this legislation compels
23. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000) (explaining that looking merely at
the "power of the dollar" is an inappropriate approach to challenging contribution limits because challenges to
contribution limits must consider "the power to mount a campaign with all the dollars likely to be
forthcoming.").
24. See id. (rejecting the contention that the First Amendment sets a one-thousand dollar low water mark
for contribution limitations). Rather, the Court held that contribution limits cannot be so low as to impede
candidates from advocating effectively. Id.
25. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 34, at 2 (July 20, 2001).
26. See Letter from Jim Knox, Executive Director, California Common Cause, to the Honorable John
Burton, President Pro Tempore, at I (May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Knox Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (criticizing Proposition 34 because it eliminates the more demanding restrictions of Proposition 208); A
Fixed Game: Proposition 34's Authors Try to Gag Their Foes, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 10, 2000, at B8
(arguing that the Legislature presented Proposition 34 to the voters because incumbents feared that Proposition
208 would not be found unconstitutional).
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 85400 (amended by Chapter 241), 85401-85403 (West Supp. 2002).
28. See, e.g., id. § 85311(d) (amended by Chapter 241) (removing hyphenation from the term "majority
owned"); id. § 85318 (amended by Chapter 241) (correcting a grammatical mistake in the text of Proposition
34); id. § 85400(b) (amended by Chapter 241) (correcting a cross-reference to another statute); id. § 85500(a),
(b) (amended by Chapter 241) (correcting grammatical errors in the text of Proposition 34); id. § 85700(a)
(amended by Chapter 241) (directing candidates to return unidentified contributions no later than sixty days
after receipt rather than within sixty days of receipt); id. § 85309 (amended by Chapter 241) (explaining that
committees formed to either support or oppose a ballot measure must disclose contributions of one thousand
dollars or more obtained during the ninety days preceding an election within twenty-four hours of receipt).
29. See generally ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 34, at I (June 26, 2001) (analyzing the provisions of SB 34).
30. Id. at 2-4.
31. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85309(c), (d) (amended by Chapter 241) (requiring candidates for elective
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disclosure of expenditures to individuals for television appearances. Political
parties must disclose payments for communications with their members.33
However, Chapter 241 liberates candidates from the requirement of disclosing
late independent expenditures within 24 hours.34 Finally, Chapter 241 changes the
location where certain elected officers and candidates for the Board of
Equalization file campaign statements.3"
Chapter 241 clarifies the treatment of campaign contributions under
Proposition 3436 and expounds on the proper use of contributions.37 Notably,
state office and committees, chiefly founded to endorse or challenge a state ballot initiative, to disclose any
contributions received outside the election cycle that meet or exceed five thousand dollars); id. § 85204 (West
Supp. 2002) (defining an election cycle as "the period of time commencing 90 days prior to an election and
ending on the date of the election.").
32. See id. § 84511 (amended by Chapter 241) (directing committees and candidates to report
expenditures in excess of five thousand dollars made to individuals for their "appearance in an advertisement to
support or oppose the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot measure" within ten days of the payment).
This section also requires notification in the advertisement that the speakers were paid for their efforts. Id.
33. See id. § 85700(b) (amended by Chapter 241) (allowing candidates or committees to return a
contribution that cannot be properly identified even if the candidates or committees already reported the
contribution); id. § 85312 (amended by Chapter 241) (excluding payments for communications to members of
an organization for supporting or opposing a candidate or ballot measure from the definition of contributions or
expenditures unless the payments are made for general public advertising). Nevertheless, payments made by
political parties for communications to their registered members must be disclosed even though they may not be
defined as contributions or expenditures under this section. Id.
34. See id. § 84204 (amended by Chapter 241) (excluding candidates from the twenty-four hour notice
requirements for late independent expenditures, but directing committees that make late independent
expenditures to report to the Secretary of State within twenty-four hours); id. § 82025 (West 1993) (defining an
expenditure as "a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a third party, or an enforceable
promise to make a payment unless there is clearly no political purpose"); id. § 82031 (West 1993) (defining an
independent expenditure as an expenditure made by any person for a communication "which expressly
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or the qualification, passage or defeat of a
clearly identified measure, or taken as a whole and in context, unambiguously urges a particular result in an
election but which is not made to or at the behest of the affected candidate or committee"); id. § 82036.5
(defining a late independent expenditure as an independent expenditure, aggregating one thousand dollars or
more, "made for or against any specific candidate or measure involved in an election before the date of the
election but after the closing date of the last campaign statement required to be filed prior to the election.").
35. See id. § 84215(a) (amended by Chapter 241) (establishing that candidates for the Board of
Equalization are not automatically required to file campaign statements in Los Angeles County or the City and
County of San Francisco); id. § 84215 (West Supp. 2002) (requiring certain elected officers or candidates of the
Equalization Board to file campaign statements with the clerk of the county in which the officers or candidates
are domiciled); id. § 84215(b)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 241) (directing certain elected officers or candidates
of the Equalization Board to file campaign statements with the Secretary of State and with the clerk of the
county with the largest number of registered voters in the affected districts).
36. See, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 85501 (amended by Chapter 241) (prohibiting a candidate's
controlled committee from contributing funds to another committee for the purpose of making independent
expenditures "to support or oppose other candidates"); id. § 85318 (amended by Chapter 241) (permitting
candidates to create separate contribution accounts for the primary and general elections, as well as special
primary and special general elections), see also id. § 85306(b) (amended by Chapter 241) (allowing a candidate
for state office who possesses campaign funds on January 1, 2001, to "use those funds to seek elective office
without attributing the funds to specific contributors" unless the candidate seeks statewide elective office). But
see id. § 85317 (amended by Chapter 241) (allowing candidates for statewide elective office to "carry over
contributions raised in connection with one election" and "pay campaign expenditures incurred in connection
with a subsequent election for the same elective state office.").
2001 / Elections
Chapter 241 regulates third-party contributions made to a political party so that
the political party can make expenditures that are coordinated with a candidate
for communications to party members related to that office-seeker's candidacy.38
Chapter 241 clarifies that, if candidates or their committees have net debts
resulting from an election held prior to January 1, 2001, contributions for that
election are not subject to the contribution limits established by Proposition 34.39
Also, Chapter 241 does not classify expenditures that are coordinated with a
candidate and benefit the candidate as independent expenditures. ° Finally,




A. May the Legislature Make Substantive Changes to a Proposition Recently
Passed by the Electorate?
The initiative is a process whereby the public independently proposes and
enacts legislation.42 Generally, the Legislature may not enact a law that will
conflict with the operation of an initiative act.43 Nevertheless, the Legislature can
amend or repeal an initiative if the voters approve the action or if the initiative
provides for legislative amendment or repeal." On the other hand, referendum is
the power of the populous to ratify or reject an act of the Legislature. Unlike
37. See id. § 89510(b) (amended by Chapter 241) (indicating that contributions can be used for
"expenses associated with the election of the candidate or for expenses associated with holding office.").
38. See id. § 85303(b) (amended by Chapter 241) (restricting contributions made to political parties for
coordinated expenditures with candidates to $25,000 per calendar year).
39. Id. § 85321 (amended by Chapter 241). But see Undoing Reform: FPPC Blows a Hole in
Proposition 34, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 13, 2001, at B6 (reporting that the FPPC decided that legislators who
had campaign committees in 2000 can accept contributions that otherwise violate Proposition 34 beyond what is
needed to retire their debts, or even if the committee has no debts at all).
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85500(b) (amended by Chapter 241).
41. See id. § 85400 (amended by Chapter 241) (outlining the monetary bounds permitted by the
voluntary expenditure limit scheme); id. § 85401(a), (b) (West Supp. 2002) (instructing candidates to file a
statement of acceptance or rejection of voluntary expenditure limits at the time they file a statement of intention
as specified by the section 85200 of the California Government Code, but allowing candidates who initially file
a statement of rejection to accept voluntary expenditure limits within fourteen days following the primary
election if the candidates do not exceed the limits in the primary election); id. § 85601(a), (c) (amended by
Chapter 241) (allowing candidates who accept voluntary expenditure limits to purchase a space on the sample
ballot for a message to voters). The message may not exceed 250 words and may not mention campaign
opponents. Id.
42. CAL. CONST. art. I1, § 8(a).
43. See People v. Schuster, 122 Cal. App. Supp. 790, 793, 10 P.2d 204, 206 (1932) (rejecting an
enactment by the Legislature that conflicted with a provision of an initiative). Voters did not give the
Legislature authority to change the initiative in question, and therefore where the initiative and legislative
enactment conflicted, the initiative prevailed. Id.
44. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
45. Id. § 9(a).
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46
initiative acts, the Legislature may freely amend or repeal referendum statutes.
The Political Reform Act of 1974 was an initiative measure.47 Proposition
208 was also an initiative s.4  The Legislature passed Proposition 34, 49 and the
public subsequently approved the legislation. ° Therefore, terms of Chapter 241
that add to or take away from the changes implemented by Proposition 34 are not
subject to constitutional attack because the Legislature is endowed with the
authority to amend and repeal referenda.' However, if Chapter 241 attempts to
amend or repeal terms of the Political Reform Act of 1974 or another initiative,
the conflicting provisions are only valid if they are consistent with the
Legislature's authority granted by the initiative in conflict.
Generally, the sections of the California Government Code amended by
Chapter 241 were either amended or enacted by Proposition 34.53 Chapter 241
does amend a section of the California Government Code that was not affected
by Proposition 34, but the Legislature originally enacted that section. ' The sole
section enacted by Chapter 241 merely codifies the FPPC's interpretation of
Proposition 34.55 Therefore, Chapter 241 does not violate the California
Constitution because Chapter 241 affects either a referendum or a legislative
statute.16
46. Id. § 10(c); see Franchise Tax Board v. Cory, 80 Cal. App. 3d 772, 776, 145 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (3rd
Dist. 1978) (defining an amendment as any act that adds to or takes away from an existing statute).
47. See 1974 Cal. Stat. meas. 9, at 1 (indicating that the Political Reform Act of 1974 was added by
initiative measure); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81012(a) (West 1993) (granting the Legislature the authority to amend
the terms of the Political Reform Act of 1974 if the proposed amendment furthered the purposes of the Act, was
passed in each house by two-thirds vote, was signed by the Governor, and met publication constraints).
48. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. prop. 208 (West), at 1.
49. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 102, at I (enacting Proposition 34).
50. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECrIONS, REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 34, at 4 (June 26, 2001) (reciting that Proposition 34 was placed
on the ballot in the November 2000 election and passed with 60.1 percent of the vote).
51. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
52. See supra note 44, 47 and accompanying text (indicating that the Political Reform Act of 1974 is an
initiative and may be amended under certain circumstances); 2001 Cal. Stat. ch. 241, sec. 20, at 3 (finding that
the provisions of Chapter 241 further the purposes of the Political Reform Act of 1974).
53. Supra Part III.
54. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 84215 (amended by Chapter 241) (indicating where campaign statements
should be filed); 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 289, sec. 35.5, at 4 (enacting section 84215 of the California Government
Code).
55. Compare Letter from Luisa Menchaca, General Counsel, California Fair Political Practices
Commission, to John R. Valencia, Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Bimey, LLP, at 3 (Apr. 11, 2001) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (concluding that outstanding loan balances that existed before January 1,
2001, are not subject to the new provisions of Proposition 34), with CAL. GOv'T CODE § 85321 (enacted by
Chapter 241 ).
56. Supra note 53-55 and accompanying text.
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B. Should Candidates Be Required to Report Promptly Certain Contributions
Received Outside the Election Cycle?
Most of the support garnered for Chapter 241 is predicated on extending
disclosure requirements to certain. contributions made outside of the election
cycle." Disclosure requirements pass constitutional muster if they are narrowly
tailored to further an important governmental interest.5 s Proposition 34 cites the
same justifications the federal government relied upon in vindicating the
disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act.5 9 The principal
difference between the disclosure requirements at issue in Buckley and those
amended by Chapter 241 is that Chapter 241 demands more frequent reporting.
6
0
Opponents of Chapter 241 may argue that the importance of the
governmental interest in providing information to the public about who
contributes money to whom is not constant.6' Likewise, opponents may charge
that if quarterly reporting mitigates actual corruption or the appearance thereof,
the greater burden imposed on candidates and contributors by immediate
disclosure is superfluous and cannot be considered narrowly tailored.62 Finally,
discarding hastened disclosure requirements will not substantially impede
enforcement of campaign contribution regulations; therefore, the provisions of
Chapter 241 are not the least restrictive means of pursuing violations of
campaign finance laws.63
57. See Letter from Gail D. Dryden, President, League of Women Voters of California, to the Honorable
John Burton, President Pro Tempore, at 1 (May 11, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(highlighting disclosure requirements for contributions in excess of five thousand dollars made outside the
election cycle); Knox Letter, supra note 26, at 1 (approving of disclosure requirements for contributions made
before the election cycle); Letter from Senator Art Torres (Ret.), Chairman, California Democratic Party to the
Honorable John Burton, President Pro Tempore, at I (May 23, 2001) [hereinafter Torres Letter] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (supporting Chapter 241 because it promotes the interests of full and regular
disclosure); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 85204 (West Supp. 2002) (defining an election cycle as the "period of time
commencing ninety days prior to an election and ending on the date of the election.").
58. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam) (requiring a substantial relation between
the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed).
59. Compare 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 102, sec. l(b)(2), (5), at I (claiming that the provisions of Proposition
34 are adopted to minimize actual or apparent corruption and provide information to the public about where
contributions originate), with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 (recognizing that informing the public of the origin of
political campaign money, deterring actual and apparent corruption by exposing details of contributions, and
gathering information necessary to enforce contribution limits all constitute important governmental interests).
60. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63 (indicating that the Federal Election Campaign Act required
quarterly reporting), with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85309(c) (amended by Chapter 241) (requiring disclosure of
contributions exceeding five thousand dollars within ten business days if the contribution is made outside the
election cycle), and CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85309(a), (b) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring disclosure of contributions
exceeding one thousand dollars within twenty-four hours if the contribution is made during the election cycle).
61. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68, n. 82 (acknowledging that public interest in the sources of
campaign funds is likely to peak during the campaign period).
62. Cf id. at 60 (summarizing and ultimately rejecting the appellants' argument that disclosure
requirements can be appropriate but were unconstitutional in Buckley because they extended to contributions
involving minimal dollar amounts).
63. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91000(c) (West Supp. 2002) (imposing a four-year statute of
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
Proponents of the quickened disclosure standard emphasize that one of the
important governmental interests in imposing disclosure requirements is
providing the public with data about campaign donations, regardless of general
public interest in the information. 64 Furthermore, the ease of electronically filing
disclosure reports lightens the pragmatic burden imposed on candidates and
campaign contributors.65  Hastened disclosure also provides for more effective
enforcement of campaign finance contribution regulations.6 Finally, proponents
argue that the quarterly reporting standard of Buckley does not constitute a high-
tide line of the burden permitted by strict scrutiny.6 In fact, more frequent
disclosure will not magnify the two burdens imposed by disclosure requirements:
deterrence of persons who would contribute absent any disclosure requirements
and harassment or retaliation against those who choose to contribute to
candidates or causes. 68 Therefore, the enhanced disclosure requirements of
Chapter 241 are not inconsistent with the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.9
C. Can the State Confer a Benefit upon One Candidate to the Exclusion of
Another Because the Former Voluntarily Accepted Expenditure Limits?
Involuntary expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.7° However,
public funds may be made available to candidates, and those funds may be
limitations on violations of title nine of the California Government Code, which includes the Political Reform
Act of 1974).
64. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 (emphasizing that the governmental interest in providing information
about campaign contributions for the public to digest is important because it allows voters who choose to
research candidates the opportunity to consider information that provides insight into a candidate's character);
Knox Letter, supra note 26, at I (commending Chapter 241 because its provisions will "provide the public with
important campaign finance data for statewide candidates and ballot measures.").
65. See Letter from Douglas R. Boyd, Sr. Esq., Treasurer, California Republican Party, to the Honorable
John Burton, President Pro Tern, at 1 (June 4, 2001) [hereinafter Boyd Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (applauding Chapter 241 because its disclosure requirements will mesh with existing Internet filing
requirements to ensure complete, electronically-accessible discourse of campaign contributions and
expenditures).
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (justifying the constitutionality of disclosure requirements, in part, on
the need to gather information necessary to enforce contribution limits).
67. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000) (refuting the argument that the
contribution limits could not constitutionally fall below one thousand dollars simply because a contribution
limit of one thousand dollars was held to be narrowly tailored to avoid actual or apparent corruption in
Buckley).
68. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74 (refusing to give minority political parties a blanket exemption from
disclosure requirements). However, minority political parties can avoid compliance with disclosure
requirements if the parties show that there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of contributors' names will
subject the contributors to embarrassment or harassment. Id.
69. Cf. id. at 66-68 (upholding the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971).
70. See id. at 54, 57, 64 (rejecting the notion that equalizing speech resources and mitigating the rising
costs of campaigning for public office constitute important governmental interests that may infringe on First
Amendment rights).
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conditioned upon acceptance of voluntarily imposed expenditure limits.' Chapter
241 clarifies provisions of Proposition 34 that permit candidates who voluntarily
accept expenditure limits to purchase a space on the sample ballot and convey a
message to voters in that space.72 Candidates who do not accept these voluntary
expenditure limits may not purchase such publishing space."
Proponents of Proposition 34 argue that voluntary expenditure limits allow
candidates and officeholders to spend less time raising campaign funds and more
time conducting public policy. 7' There is a problematic assumption with this
argument: Incumbents will eventually avoid raising campaign funds during their
tenure because, once they reach the amount of funds that voluntary expenditure
limits permit, they will no longer have an incentive to raise additional campaign
funds. 7' Raising campaign funds creates a "war chest" that deters challengers
76from running for office. Incumbents will raise sufficient funds to scare off
challengers and then adopt voluntary expenditure limits if no serious challenge
arises; otherwise incumbents will unleash their war chests and defend their
positions."
71. See, e.g., id. at 57, n. 65 (indicating that availability of public financing of the presidential election
campaign may be conditioned upon voluntarily accepted expenditure limits); id. at 92-93 (upholding the
constitutionality of conditioned public financing of presidential campaigns because the public financing
facilitated and enlarged public discussion and participation in the political process).
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85400 (amended by Chapter 241) (establishing the maximum amounts that
candidates who accept voluntary expenditure limits can spend for the primary election and general election); id.
§ 85601(a) (amended by Chapter 241) (restricting messages placed on the state ballot by those candidates who
accepted voluntary expenditure limits to no more than 250 words). Moreover, the candidates cannot refer to
their opponents in the message. Id.
73. Id. § 85601(b) (amended by Chapter 241).
74. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 102, sec. l(b)(4), at 1.
75. See Dan Standford, Eileen Padberg & Howard L. Owens, Argument in Favor of Proposition 34,
STATE VOTER PAMPHLET 2000, GENERAL ELECTION (indicating that voluntary expenditure limits will keep
spending under control).
76. See, e.g., Dan Morain, Fund-Raising Feats a Mixed Bag for Davis Politics: Cache Scares Foes, But
How He Built it Raises Questions of Priorities, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at Al (suggesting that Governor
Gray Davis raised more than thirty million dollars during his tenure as governor to deter rivals in the upcoming
gubernatorial election). But see Lyn Ragsdale & Timothy E. Cook, Representatives' Actions and Challengers'
Reactions: Limits to Candidate Connections in the House, 31 AM. J. POL. ScI. 45 (1987) cited in DANIEL HAYS
LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 660 (1st ed. 1995) (indicating that researchers have
been unable to find evidence that incumbent activities discourage strong challenges). But Professor Lowenstein
suggests that evidence is difficult to amass because incumbents are not willing to forgo accepting campaign
contributions during their tenure so that a controlled experiment can take place. Id.
77. Cf DAVID K. LEVINE, THE CASTLE ON THE HILL 5 (Jan. 4, 2000). The author provides the example
of a simple game between a Lord of a castle and a Serf. The Lord moves first and must either defend the castle
or consume. The Serf moves second and may either attack the castle or consume. If the game is played only
once, both the Lord and the Serf will consume. Id. at 6. If the game is repeated, the Lord will defend and the
Serf will attack. Id. at 9. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 85401 (West Supp. 2002) (allowing candidates to accept
voluntary expenditure limits after the primary elections, after incumbents know with certainty who their
challengers will be); id. § 85402 (West Supp. 2002) (liberating candidates who accepted voluntary expenditure
limits from the sums outlined in section 85400 of the California Government Code if opponents contribute
personal funds to their campaigns exceeding the limits imposed by section 85400 of the California Government
Code); see also, e.g., Jim Miller, Many Candidates Accept Spending Caps, Others Say They Rejected the
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Opponents of Chapter 241 argue that voluntary expenditure limits rarely fall
within the caveat created by the U.S. Supreme Court because the restrictions do
not expand political speech, but limit it.7" No doubt the authors of Proposition 34
and Chapter 241 considered this argument and consequently allowed candidates
who accepts voluntary expenditure limits to expand their speech by publishing
advocacy statements in the sample ballots.79 Given the large number of sample
ballots that are distributed throughout the State, this quid pro quo seems to
expand exposure to political speech by providing every candidate who accepts
expenditure limits with an opportunity to reach every voter.s Opponents counter
that candidates who accept voluntary expenditure limits forsake political speech
of potentially unlimited quantity and scope for speech of limited space and
restricted subject matter.8 ' Such an exchange does not enlarge public discussion;
rather it mitigates the amount of information available to the public by injecting
short, controlled statements from candidates instead of allowing candidates to
12control their own campaigns.
D. May Proposition 34 Prohibit Officeholders in Their Last Term from
Fundraising?
FPPC staff contends that Proposition 34 bars legislators who are ineligible to
run for re-election due to term limits 3 and who are not seeking another office
Voluntary Campaign Limits to Stay Competitive, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 25, 2001, at A3 (noting that the vast
majority of candidates for the 2002 election cycle accepted expenditure limits; "but others, particularly those in
races predicted to be close, have rejected the caps and say they will spend whatever it takes to win.").
78. See BeVier, supra note 6, at II (arguing that voluntary expenditure limits reduce the amount of
campaign speech because their goal is to reduce allegedly excessive spending); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
92-95 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding voluntary expenditure limits that enlarge and facilitate political speech).
79. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85601 (amended by Chapter 241) (allowing candidates to purchase a space
in the state ballot pamphlet for conveying a message to voters).
80. See CAL. JUR. 3D, Elections § 131 (2002) (indicating each registered voter is mailed a sample
ballot).
81. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 86-89 (describing the voluntary expenditure limits upheld in Buckley
as a system where presidential candidates receive public funds if certain spending ceilings are not exceeded),
with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85601(a) (amended by Chapter 241) (giving candidates who accept voluntary
expenditure limits the ability to purchase a space to place a message on the state ballot pamphlets that does not
exceed 250 words nor refer to an opponent); see, e.g., Miller, supra note 77, at A3 (reciting a candidate's
reluctance to limit his ability to campaign in exchange for 250 words in the ballot pamphlet).
82. Miller, supra note 77, at A3; cf. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1425 (8th Cir.
1995) (rejecting a state voluntary expenditure law that did not allow candidates who rejected voluntary
expenditure limits to receive contributions from certain donors and compelled candidates who rejected
voluntary expenditure limits to report all expenditures daily). The Eighth Circuit admitted that it was "hard-
pressed to discern how the interests of good government could possibly be served by campaign expenditure
laws that necessarily have the effect of limiting the quantity of political speech in which candidates for public
office are allowed to engage." Id. at 1426.
83. CAL. CONST. art. IV § 2 (limiting state senators to two terms and state assembly members to three
terms).
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from receiving campaign contributions during their last term of office. 4
Originally, Chapter 241 expressly permitted termed-out legislators to raise
campaign funds." The Legislature rescinded this provision when the Legislative
Counsel opined that these termed-out office holders could not be barred from
raising campaign funds.86
Courts interpreting an act of the Legislature must interpret statutes so that
they are workable, reasonable, and in accord with common sense and justice."
Likewise, judicial review demands that a statute "should be construed, wherever
possible, so as to preserve its constitutionality. '8 A court will not rescind the
interpretation of an enactment made by those charged with its enforcement unless
the construction is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.89 However, the FPPC has
not taken an official position on the proper interpretation of section 85316 of the
California Government Code.'
Both sides of the argument agree that termed-out officeholders are still
statutory candidates.9' Furthermore, both sides agree that termed-out
84. See Letter from Holly Armstrong, Staff Counsel, Legal Division, California Fair Political Practices
Commission, to C. April Boling, CPA, at 1 (Apr. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Armstrong Letter] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (allowing a State Assemblymember to raise funds for officeholder expenses because
the Assemblymember is seeking another term). Ms. Armstrong premised her conclusion on section 85316 of the
California Government Code. Id. at 2. See also CAL. GoV'T CODE § 85316 (West Supp. 2002) (stating, "[a]
contribution for an election may be accepted by a candidate for elective state office after the date of the election
only to the extent that the contribution does not exceed net debts outstanding from the election, and the
contribution does not otherwise exceed the applicable contribution limit for that election.").
85. See SB 34 § 11 (2001) (as amended on Mar. 7, 2001, but not enacted) (amending section 85316 of
the California Government Code to allow legislators serving their last term because of term limits to accept
contributions for officeholder expenses).
86. See SB 34 (2001) (as amended on Mar. 27, 2001) (striking the section proposing an amendment
section 85316 of the California Government Code); Letter from Michael B. Salerno, Principal Deputy,
Legislative Counsel, to the Honorable John Burton, President Pro Tempore (Mar. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Salerno
Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
87. See American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Low, 84 Cal. App. 4th 914, 924, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 294 (2nd
Dist. 2000) (holding that section 1063.1 of the California Insurance Code is clear on its face and rejecting an
interpretation of the statute that is inconsistent with its plain meaning).
88. See Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 54 Cal. 3d 245, 268, 271-72,
284 Cal. Rptr. 718, 732, 734 (1991) (rejecting the argument that punitive damages awarded "per act" means that
defendants can face the punitive damage fee multiplied several times over for committing one discriminatory
act multiple times against a single plaintiff).
89. See People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 294, 309, 314, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 865,
869 (1996) (affirming the Attorney General's conclusion that faucet water is a source of drinking water).
90. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18531.6 (2002) (issuing regulations pursuant to authority granted in
section 85316 of the California Government Code, but not addressing the FPPC staff position that generally
termed-out legislators cannot raise campaign funds during their last term in office, unless they are running for
another office).
91. Salerno Letter, supra note 86, at 5; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82007 (West 1993) (imposing the title
of candidate until the status is terminated pursuant to section 84214 of the California Government Code); id. §
84214 (West 1993) (stating that the FPPC may determine when a person is no longer a candidate). The FPPC
adopted title 2, section 18404(d) of the California Code of Regulations, which states that the term candidate
includes officeholders. Thus an officeholder who cannot run for re-election because of term limits and has not
decided to run for another office is still a candidate under the California Government Code. CAL. CODE REGS.
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officeholders may raise campaign funds to retire debt and may use such
contributions to pay for administrative costs incurred while paying off the debt of
previous campaigns.92 The main controversy is whether termed-out officeholders
can raise campaign funds during their last term if the office holders are not
seeking another elective office.93
The Legislative Counsel argues that barring termed-out legislators from
raising funds creates different classes in the Legislature. 9 Proponents of banning
this type of fund-raising argue that lawmakers in their last term are essentially
unaccountable to voters because they cannot be re-elected.95 Moreover,
proponents of the ban argue that sufficient funding is available for legitimate
office expenditures of these termed-out legislators, including transportation to
their districts and constituent courtesies.9 6
Regardless of who has the better rhetorical argument, there are constitutional
issues that confront this restrictive interpretation of section 85316 of the
California Government Code.97 Again, Buckley demands that efforts to limit
political contributions be narrowly tailored to avoid actual or apparent
corruption.98 Proponents of the restrictive interpretation emphasize that giving
campaign contributions to termed-out legislators who are no longer accountable
to the electorate heightens the risk of corruption or apparent corruption.99
Nevertheless, an absolute ban on campaign donations is over-inclusive because
tit. 2, § 18404(d) (2002).
92. Armstrong Letter, supra note 84, at 3; Salerno letter, supra note 86, at 7.
93. See Salerno Letter, supra note 86, at 3 (recognizing that the FPPC staff concluded that termed-out
legislators generally could not accept campaign contributions during their last term in office after voters
approved Proposition 34); Armstrong Letter, supra note 84, at 3 (advising that a member of the Legislature may
continue to accept campaign donations in excess of debt carried over from the member's last campaign because
the member is seeking another term).
94. See Salerno Letter, supra note 86, at 7 (suggesting that adopting the FPPC's ban would lead to one
class of legislators who cannot engage in certain office-related activities because public funding is unavailable).
Those activities include responding to political invitations and requests for endorsements, and sending
newsletters or other mass mailings. Id. But see Undoing Reform: Termed-Out Lawmakers Shouldn't Get Slush
Funds, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 6, 2001, at DI [hereinafter Undoing Reform] (arguing that if there are
insufficient public funds to cover office-holding expenses, it is because resources are improperly allocated).
95. See Undoing Reform, supra note 94, at DI (arguing that termed-out legislators that accept campaign
contributions will cater to big contributors without fear of repercussion).
96. Id.
97. See Salerno Letter, supra note 86, at 7 (warning that the FPPC violates First Amendment rights of
speech and association by prohibiting termed-out legislators from accepting contributions during their last term
in office).
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
99. See, e.g., FPPC Backs Lawmakers Over Fundraising, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 14, 2001, at A5
(outlining campaign reform advocates' artgument that "termed-out officeholder should have no need to raise or
spend campaign money during their final terms, and that doing so further taints the legislative process"); John
Hill, Termed Out, But Not Out of Cash, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 4, 2001, at Al (quoting Jim Knox, director of
California Common Cause, as saying, "[d]onors give for the same and only reason they always give. That's to
influence the outcome. It's particularly transparent when contributions are given to someone who's not running
for office again.").
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not all legislators are corrupt,'° and there are legitimate expenses that are met
with campaign donations during a legislator's last term in office.' °' Furthermore,
an absolute ban on campaign donations is also under-inclusive because
legislators who are eligible for re-election can still accept campaign contributions
under the restrictive interpretation section 85316 of the California Government
Code.' 02 Thus, despite the potentially elevated risk of corruption or appearance of
corruption that occurs when termed-out legislators receive contributions during
their last term in office, a complete moratorium on campaign contributions is not
narrowly tailored such that it survives constitutional scrutiny.' 3
V. CONCLUSION
Both proponents and opponents of campaign finance reform applaud
enhanced disclosure requirements of campaign contributions.'0 The disclosure
requirements of Chapter 241 provide Californians with valuable information that
renders important insight into the state political process.'M On the other hand,
voluntary expenditure limits inhibit political speech and fail to provide adequate
incentives to curb allegedly out-of-control spending and time-consuming
fundraising activities.
Advocates of stringent campaign finance regulations consistently
characterize the perceived ills of private campaign donations as symptoms of a
100. See Campaign Finance Revisions: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, 105th Congress (Feb. 1, 1996) (recounting the testimony of Bradley A. Smith, Assistant
Professor of Law, Capitol University Law School, which challenged the notion that politicians are "corrupt
bribe-takers").
101. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 99, at Al (recounting examples of costs that termed-out lawmakers must
incur during their last term of office but are not paid by the State: trips associated with political speeches, gifts
to staff, clothing for political events, and Christmas cards); Salerno Letter, supra note 86, at 7 (arguing that
termed-out officeholders must be allowed to accept campaign contributions during their last term in office
because public funds are unavailable for political functions, and termed-out legislators must be allowed to raise
campaign funds for the furtherance of their own goals and the goals of their colleagues).
102. See Armstrong Letter, supra note 84, at I (allowing a candidate to raise campaign funds while in
office because she is running for another term).
103. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 (finding that contribution limitations were narrowly tailored to
avoid actual or apparent corruption because people were free to engage in political expression by contributing
finances in a limited yet substantial degree), with Armstrong Letter, supra note 84, at 3 (generally prohibiting
termed-out legislators fulfilling their last term from receiving contributions unless they are running for another
office).
104. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60 (recognizing that the appellants in Buckley who challenged the
Federal Election Campaign Act agreed that disclosure requirements are the proper solution to the perceived ills
of the campaign finance reform system); Torres Letter, supra note 57 (praising the disclosure requirements of
Chapter 241); Boyd Letter, supra note 65 (supporting Chapter 241 because of the enactment's disclosure
requirements).
105. Supra Part IV.B.
106. Supra Part IV.C; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 (rejecting the notion that the government has an
interest in checking the amount of money spent in political campaigns),
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regulatory scheme that is either not restrictive enough or not properly enforced. 07
However, all campaign finance regulation must ultimately face the simple truth
that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution endorses participation in
public debate.' 8 Therefore, private monetary contribution to public officeholders
and individual spending in political campaigns will continue regardless of the
restrictive nature of campaign finance regulation because the First Amendment
prohibits statutes that absolutely ban either parties from donating money to other
candidates or individuals from spending any of their personal wealth in
furtherance of their own political goals.""° Given these First Amendment
protections, the superior means of holding candidates accountable for the
contributions they secure is complete and immediate disclosure of all meaningful
campaign contributions they receive." Chapter 241 moves closer to full and
immediate disclosure, but it also extends its reach into heightened regulation of
campaign contributions, which makes tracing those contributions more
difficult."' Chapter 241's movement in the former direction is praiseworthy; its
movement in the latter direction is not.
107. See, e.g., Kevin Yamamura, Prop. 34's No Obstacle to Flow of Campaign Cash, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 2, 2002, at Al (quoting Jim Knox, executive director of California Common Cause, as saying,
"[Independent Expenditure Committees] are a fact of life, and I think they will be until we have public
financing of campaigns where candidates are beholden only to taxpayers and not to contributors or IECs
working on their behalf"); Carl Ingram, The State Panel Accused of Designing Law Loophole Politics: FPPC
Chided for Ruling on Prop. 34 Ban of Big Donations, Its Chief Says that Incumbents Don't Have to Exploit It,
L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2002, at B10 (criticizing the FPPC for exempting state legislators from Proposition 34's
campaign contributions and calling the Commission a "toothless watchdog").
108. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
109. Supra Part 1.
110. Daniel Weintraub, Campaign Finance Limits Feel Good But Don't Do Good, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Jan. 17, 2002, at B9.
11. See id. (arguing that complicated regulatory schemes for campaign contributions does not change
the amount of money spent on campaigns or diminish the contributor's influence on officeholders).
Mr. Weintraub concludes that despite these restrictive laws, "the politicians ... will know exactly who helped
put them in office. The rest of us will have to work that much harder to learn the same thing." Id.

